Asymmetric Nash insurance bargaining between risk-averse parties

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<dc:creator> Boonen, Tim J.</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Chi, Yichun</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>International Actuarial Association</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-01-15</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Sumario: This paper analyzes asymmetric Nash bargaining in proportional insurance contracts between a risk-averse insured and a risk-averse insurer. It provides a necessary and sufficient condition under which the no-insurance status quo is Pareto optimal. When this condition fails, the authors derive the corresponding optimal bargaining solution. Under decreasing absolute risk aversion for both parties, and when the insurer's initial wealth decreases with the insurable risk in reversed hazard rate order, the optimal insurance coverage and premium increase with the insured's risk aversion and the insurer's bargaining power. Additionally, if the insured exhibits constant absolute risk aversion, higher insurer initial wealth leads to greater optimal coverage</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/189425.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Contrato de seguro</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Economía del seguro</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Cálculo actuarial</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Reaseguro</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Demanda de seguros</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Primas de seguros</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Matemática del seguro</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Modelos matemáticos</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Asymmetric Nash insurance bargaining between risk-averse parties</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: Astin bulletin. - Belgium : ASTIN and AFIR Sections of the International Actuarial Association = ISSN 0515-0361. - 19/01/2026 Volume 56 Issue 1 - January 2026 , p.  243 - 269</dc:relation>
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