Dynamic insurance contracts and adverse selection
Título: Dynamic insurance contracts and adverse selection / Maarten C. W. Janssen, Vladimir A. Karamychev
Autor: Janssen, Maarten C. W.
Notas: This article take a dynamic perspective on insurance markets under adverse selection and study a dynamic version of the Rothschild and Stiglitz model. Investigate the nature of dynamic insurance contracts by considering both conditional and unconditional dynamic contract. An unconditional dynamic contract has insurance companies offering contract where the terms of the contract depend on time, but not on the occurrence of past accidents
Registros relacionados: En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Orlando. - Volume 72, number 1, March 2005 ; p. 45-59
Autores secundários: Karamychev, Vladimir A.
Títulos secundários: Título: The Journal of risk and insurance
Outras classificações: 6
Direitos: In Copyright (InC): http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/