Pension portfolio choice and peer envy

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      <subfield code="a">Pension portfolio choice and peer envy</subfield>
      <subfield code="c">Jacqueline Volkman Wise</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">I examine the effect of envy on the portfolio allocation of workers in a defined contribution (DC) pension plan. If a worker¿s DC plan performs better than his co-worker¿s, he may gloat; on the other hand, if his DC plan performs worse, he may feel envy. I model anticipated envy when workers make portfolio allocations, and find that in equilibrium, workers will mimic their co-worker¿s allocation to eliminate the disutility from envy. This portfolio allocation is riskier than that of a worker who does not exhibit envy.</subfield>
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      <subfield code="w">MAP20077000727</subfield>
      <subfield code="t">The Journal of risk and insurance</subfield>
      <subfield code="d">Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-</subfield>
      <subfield code="x">0022-4367</subfield>
      <subfield code="g">03/06/2013 Volumen 80 Número 2 - junio 2013 </subfield>
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      <subfield code="y">MÁS INFORMACIÓN</subfield>
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