Pension portfolio choice and peer envy
Título: Pension portfolio choice and peer envy / Jacqueline Volkman Wise
Autor: Volkman Wise, Jacqueline
Notas: Sumario: I examine the effect of envy on the portfolio allocation of workers in a defined contribution (DC) pension plan. If a worker¿s DC plan performs better than his co-worker¿s, he may gloat; on the other hand, if his DC plan performs worse, he may feel envy. I model anticipated envy when workers make portfolio allocations, and find that in equilibrium, workers will mimic their co-worker¿s allocation to eliminate the disutility from envy. This portfolio allocation is riskier than that of a worker who does not exhibit envy.
Otras clasificaciones: 1
Derechos: In Copyright (InC): http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/