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Pension portfolio choice and peer envy

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<dc:creator>Volkman Wise, Jacqueline</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2013-06-03</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Sumario: I examine the effect of envy on the portfolio allocation of workers in a defined contribution (DC) pension plan. If a worker¿s DC plan performs better than his co-worker¿s, he may gloat; on the other hand, if his DC plan performs worse, he may feel envy. I model anticipated envy when workers make portfolio allocations, and find that in equilibrium, workers will mimic their co-worker¿s allocation to eliminate the disutility from envy. This portfolio allocation is riskier than that of a worker who does not exhibit envy.</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/143563.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>spa</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Pension portfolio choice and peer envy</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 03/06/2013 Volumen 80 Número 2 - junio 2013 </dc:relation>
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