Asymmetric information, self-selection, and pricing of insurance contracts : the simple no-claims case

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<rdf:Description>
<dc:date>2014-12-01</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Sumario: This article presents an optional bonus-malus contract based on a priori risk classification of the underlying insurance contract. By inducing self-selection, the purchase of the bonus-malus contract can be used as a screening device. This gives an even better pricing performance than both an experience rating scheme and a classical no-claims bonus system. An application to the Danish automobile insurance market is considered.</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/150742.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>spa</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Asymmetric information, self-selection, and pricing of insurance contracts : the simple no-claims case</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 01/12/2014 Volumen 81 Número 4 - diciembre 2014 </dc:relation>
</rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>