LDR | | | 00000cab a2200000 4500 |
001 | | | MAP20150001863 |
003 | | | MAP |
005 | | | 20150122171301.0 |
008 | | | 150112e20141201esp|||p |0|||b|spa d |
040 | | | $aMAP$bspa$dMAP |
084 | | | $a7 |
245 | 0 | 0 | $aAsymmetric information, self-selection, and pricing of insurance contracts$b: the simple no-claims case$cCatherine Donnelly...[et.al] |
520 | | | $aThis article presents an optional bonus-malus contract based on a priori risk classification of the underlying insurance contract. By inducing self-selection, the purchase of the bonus-malus contract can be used as a screening device. This gives an even better pricing performance than both an experience rating scheme and a classical no-claims bonus system. An application to the Danish automobile insurance market is considered. |
773 | 0 | | $wMAP20077000727$tThe Journal of risk and insurance$dNueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-$x0022-4367$g01/12/2014 Volumen 81 Número 4 - diciembre 2014 |
856 | | | $yMÁS INFORMACIÓN$umailto:centrodocumentacion@fundacionmapfre.org?subject=Consulta%20de%20una%20publicaci%C3%B3n%20&body=Necesito%20m%C3%A1s%20informaci%C3%B3n%20sobre%20este%20documento%3A%20%0A%0A%5Banote%20aqu%C3%AD%20el%20titulo%20completo%20del%20documento%20del%20que%20desea%20informaci%C3%B3n%20y%20nos%20pondremos%20en%20contacto%20con%20usted%5D%20%0A%0AGracias%20%0A |