Pension regulation, firm borrowing, and investment risk

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<dc:creator>Lay, Margaret J. </dc:creator>
<dc:date>2020-12-01</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Sumario: This article builds a new model of capital structure and nonpension investment decisions to show that regulatory and investment incentives created by accrued pension obligations exacerbate traditional agency problems between stockholders and bondholders. The article identifies conditions under which firms with accrued pension liabilities have an incentive to choose an overly risky capital structure, invest in risky projects with negative net present value, and/or under-fund their pension accounts.</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/174076.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Pensiones</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Inversiones</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Gerencia de riesgos</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Regulación</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Pension regulation, firm borrowing, and investment risk</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 01/12/2020 Volumen 87 Número 4 - diciembre 2020 , p. 935-968</dc:relation>
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