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Hererogeneous beliefs and the demand for D&O insurance by listed companies

Recurso electrónico / Electronic resource
MARC record
Tag12Value
LDR  00000cab a2200000 4500
001  MAP20160000764
003  MAP
005  20160113172222.0
008  160111e20151201esp|||p |0|||b|spa d
040  ‎$a‎MAP‎$b‎spa‎$d‎MAP
084  ‎$a‎332
1001 ‎$0‎MAPA20160000689‎$a‎Egger, Peter
24510‎$a‎Hererogeneous beliefs and the demand for D&O insurance by listed companies‎$c‎Peter Egger, Doina Radulescu, Ray Rees
520  ‎$a‎This article introduces a new rationale for the existence of directors' and officers (D&O) insurance. We use a model with volatile stock markets where shareholders design compensation schemes that incentivize managers to stimulate short-term increases in stock prices that do not maximize longrun stock market value.We show that D&O insurance provides a convenient instrument for the initial shareholders of a company to take advantage of differences in beliefs between insiders and outsiders in capital markets. The empirical results support the idea that both the insurance coverage and the premium are higher in the presence of new shareholders and volatile markets. The results prove robust in various empirical model specifications.
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080556402‎$a‎Seguro D&O
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080633790‎$a‎Seguro de responsabilidad civil patronal
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080605742‎$a‎Directivos de empresas
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080590567‎$a‎Empresas de seguros
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080578879‎$a‎Análisis empírico
7001 ‎$0‎MAPA20160000696‎$a‎Radulescu, Doina
7001 ‎$0‎MAPA20160000702‎$a‎Rees, Ray
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000727‎$t‎The Journal of risk and insurance‎$d‎Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-‎$x‎0022-4367‎$g‎01/12/2015 Volumen 82 Número 4 - diciembre 2015 , p. 823-852