Hererogeneous beliefs and the demand for D&O insurance by listed companies
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| Tag | 1 | 2 | Valor |
|---|---|---|---|
| LDR | 00000cab a2200000 4500 | ||
| 001 | MAP20160000764 | ||
| 003 | MAP | ||
| 005 | 20160113172222.0 | ||
| 008 | 160111e20151201esp|||p |0|||b|spa d | ||
| 040 | $aMAP$bspa$dMAP | ||
| 084 | $a332 | ||
| 100 | 1 | $0MAPA20160000689$aEgger, Peter | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | $aHererogeneous beliefs and the demand for D&O insurance by listed companies$cPeter Egger, Doina Radulescu, Ray Rees |
| 520 | $aThis article introduces a new rationale for the existence of directors' and officers (D&O) insurance. We use a model with volatile stock markets where shareholders design compensation schemes that incentivize managers to stimulate short-term increases in stock prices that do not maximize longrun stock market value.We show that D&O insurance provides a convenient instrument for the initial shareholders of a company to take advantage of differences in beliefs between insiders and outsiders in capital markets. The empirical results support the idea that both the insurance coverage and the premium are higher in the presence of new shareholders and volatile markets. The results prove robust in various empirical model specifications. | ||
| 650 | 4 | $0MAPA20080556402$aSeguro D&O | |
| 650 | 4 | $0MAPA20080633790$aSeguro de responsabilidad civil patronal | |
| 650 | 4 | $0MAPA20080605742$aDirectivos de empresas | |
| 650 | 4 | $0MAPA20080590567$aEmpresas de seguros | |
| 650 | 4 | $0MAPA20080578879$aAnálisis empírico | |
| 700 | 1 | $0MAPA20160000696$aRadulescu, Doina | |
| 700 | 1 | $0MAPA20160000702$aRees, Ray | |
| 773 | 0 | $wMAP20077000727$tThe Journal of risk and insurance$dNueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-$x0022-4367$g01/12/2015 Volumen 82 Número 4 - diciembre 2015 , p. 823-852 |