Multidimensional screening in insurance markets with adverse selection

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<dc:creator>Crocker, Keith J.</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Snow, Arthur</dc:creator>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Sumario: Bundled coverage of different losses and distinct perils, along with differential deductibles and policy limits, are common features of insurance contracts. We show that, through these practices, insurers can implement multidimensional screening of insurance applicants who possess hidden knowledge of their risks, and thereby reduce the externality cost of adverse selection. Competitive forces drive insurers to exploit multidimensional screening, enhancing the efficiency of insurance contracting. Moreover, multidimensional screening allows competitive insurance markets to attain pure strategy Nash equilibria over a wider range of applicant pools, resolving completely the RothschildStiglitz nonexistence puzzle in markets where the perils space is sufficiently divisible. </dc:description>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">In Copyright (InC) -</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Estudios de investigación</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Coberturas</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Contrato de seguro</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Comunicación del riesgo</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Obligaciones del asegurado</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Selección de riesgos</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Selección adversa</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Multidimensional screening in insurance markets with adverse selection</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 01/06/2011 Tomo 78 Número 2  - 2011 </dc:relation>