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Why do employers self-insure? new explanations for the choice of self-insurance vs. purchased health insurance

Recurso electrónico / electronic resource
Registro MARC
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001  MAP20120043787
003  MAP
005  20121026113959.0
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040  ‎$a‎MAP‎$b‎spa‎$d‎MAP
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1001 ‎$0‎MAPA20110023423‎$a‎Feldman, Roger
24510‎$a‎Why do employers self-insure? new explanations for the choice of self-insurance vs. purchased health insurance‎$c‎Roger Feldman
520  ‎$a‎This paper proposes that an employer's choice of self-insurance vs. purchased health insurance can be explained by a trade-off between administrator moral hazard, the incentive for third-party administrators to be inefficient managers of self-insured employers medical claims and employer moral hazard, the insured employer's failure to invest in reducing health risks among its workers. These explanations have not been analysed in the literature but they are broadly consistent with data and they can explain the increasing popularity of self-insurance over the past 10 years.
650 1‎$0‎MAPA20080573867‎$a‎Seguro de salud
650 1‎$0‎MAPA20080590567‎$a‎Empresas de seguros
650 1‎$0‎MAPA20080588953‎$a‎Análisis de riesgos
650 1‎$0‎MAPA20080567118‎$a‎Reclamaciones
650 1‎$0‎MAPA20080553326‎$a‎Autoseguro
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077100215‎$t‎Geneva papers on risk and insurance : issues and practice‎$d‎Geneva : The Geneva Association, 1976-‎$x‎1018-5895‎$g‎08/10/2012 Volumen 37 Número 4 - octubre 2012 , p. 696-711