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Corporate governance and risk taking : evidence from the U.K. and German insurance markets

Recurso electrónico / electronic resource
Registro MARC
Tag12Valor
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100  ‎$0‎MAPA20080644529‎$a‎Eling, Martin
24510‎$a‎Corporate governance and risk taking‎$b‎: evidence from the U.K. and German insurance markets‎$c‎Martin Eling, Sebastian D. Marek
520  ‎$a‎We analyze the impact of factors related to corporate governance (i.e., compensation, monitoring, and ownership structure) on risk taking in the insurance industry. We measure asset, product, and financial risk in insurance companies and employ a structural equation model in which corporate governance is modeled as a latent factor. Based on this model, we present empirical evidence on the link between corporate governance and risk taking, considering insurers from two large European insurance markets. Higher levels of compensation, increased monitoring (more independent boards with more meetings), and more blockholders are associated with lower risk taking. Our empirical results provide justification for including factors related to corporate governance in insurance regulation
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080596880‎$a‎Gobierno corporativo
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080586294‎$a‎Mercado de seguros
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080591182‎$a‎Gerencia de riesgos
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080584344‎$a‎Control de riesgos
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080557935‎$a‎Econometría
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080601508‎$a‎Estudios estadísticos
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080557010‎$a‎Accionistas
651 1‎$0‎MAPA20080638290‎$a‎Reino Unido
651 1‎$0‎MAPA20080637996‎$a‎Alemania
7001 ‎$0‎MAPA20120013506‎$a‎Marek, Sebastian D.
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000727‎$t‎The Journal of risk and insurance‎$d‎Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-‎$x‎0022-4367‎$g‎01/09/2014 Volumen 81 Número 3 - septiembre 2014 , p. 653-682