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Nonexclusivity, linear pricing, and annuity market screening

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040  ‎$a‎MAP‎$b‎spa‎$d‎MAP
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100  ‎$0‎MAPA20110019532‎$a‎Rothschild, Casey
24510‎$a‎Nonexclusivity, linear pricing, and annuity market screening‎$c‎Casey Rothschild
520  ‎$a‎I develop a graphical approach for studying two-type adverse-selection insurance markets with (1) compulsory contracting, (2) linear pricing, (3) nonexclusive contracting, and (4) multiple indemnity states. The UK compulsory annuity market is a natural application. Despite fully linear pricing and nonexclusivity, screening of different types into distinct contractsusing the pattern of insurance payments across distinct indemnity states rather than quantity restrictionsis possible. Efficient screening involves distorting both types¿ contracts away from first best contracts, for example, via front-loaded annuities. These distortions are attributable to convexification constraints that I identify as the nonexclusive, linear-pricing analog of canonical incentive compatibility constraints.
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000727‎$t‎The Journal of risk and insurance‎$d‎Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-‎$x‎0022-4367‎$g‎02/03/2015 Volumen 82 Número 1 - marzo 2015
856  ‎$y‎MÁS INFORMACIÓN‎$u‎mailto:centrodocumentacion@fundacionmapfre.org?subject=Consulta%20de%20una%20publicaci%C3%B3n%20&body=Necesito%20m%C3%A1s%20informaci%C3%B3n%20sobre%20este%20documento%3A%20%0A%0A%5Banote%20aqu%C3%AD%20el%20titulo%20completo%20del%20documento%20del%20que%20desea%20informaci%C3%B3n%20y%20nos%20pondremos%20en%20contacto%20con%20usted%5D%20%0A%0AGracias%20%0A