Partial benefits in the social security disability insurance program

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<dc:creator>Yin, Na</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2015-06-01</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Sumario: The current U.S. Social Security Disability Insurance program is an all-or-nothing system that has been criticized for creating strong work disincentives. In an empirically grounded and calibrated life-cycle model, I simulate behavioral responses to a partial disability benefit system, a policy alternative to the current program, which allows individuals to claim partial disability and combine earnings with disability benefits. Simulation results show financial savings for the program as well as welfare improvements for individuals with disabilities.</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/152915.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>spa</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Partial benefits in the social security disability insurance program</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 01/06/2015 Volumen 82 Número 2 - junio 2015 </dc:relation>
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