Corporate governance and cash holdings : evidence from the U.S. property-liability insurance industry
Título: Corporate governance and cash holdings : evidence from the U.S. property-liability insurance industry / Wen-Yen Hsu, Yenyu Huang, Gene Lai
Autor: Hsu, Wen-Yen
Notas: Sumario: This article examines the impact of board and finance committee characteristics on insurers' cash holdings using a sample of 1,454 U.S. stock propertyliability insurer-year observations. We focus on the roles of independent board members and independent finance committee members. Our results suggest that independent board members allow managers to hold excess cash holdings to avoid underinvestment and play a monitoring role in managers' cash spending behavior in a regulated industry. The overall findings are consistent with the independent director responsibility hypothesis, which suggests that independent directors play a monitoring role in managers' cash spending behavior and avoiding underinvestment problems.
Registros relacionados: En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 07/09/2015 Volumen 82 Número 3 - septiembre 2015 , p. 715-748
Otras clasificaciones: 33
Derechos: In Copyright (InC): http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/