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On lawsuits, corporate governance, and directors' and officers' liability insurance

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<title>On lawsuits, corporate governance, and directors' and officers' liability insurance</title>
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<namePart>Gillan, Stuart L.</namePart>
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<namePart>Panasian, Christine A.</namePart>
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<abstract displayLabel="Summary">Weexamine whether information about firms' directors' and officers' (D&O) liability insurance coverage provides insights into the likelihood of shareholder lawsuits. Using Canadian firms, we find evidence that firms with D&O insurance coverage are more likely to be sued and that the likelihood of litigation increases with increased coverage. These findings are consistent with managerial opportunism or moral hazard related to the insurance purchase decision. We also find that higher premiums are associated with the likelihood of litigation, indicating that insurers price this behavior. Taken together, the findings suggest that coverage and premium levels have the potential to convey information about lawsuit likelihood, and a firm's governance quality, to the marketplace. </abstract>
<note type="statement of responsibility">Stuart L. Gillan, Christine A. Panasian</note>
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<topic>Seguro D&O</topic>
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<subject xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080591182">
<topic>Gerencia de riesgos</topic>
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<subject xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20100006429">
<topic>Directors and officers (insurance)</topic>
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<title>The Journal of risk and insurance</title>
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<publisher>Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-</publisher>
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<identifier type="issn">0022-4367</identifier>
<identifier type="local">MAP20077000727</identifier>
<part>
<text>01/12/2015 Volumen 82 Número 4 - diciembre 2015 , p. 793-822</text>
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