Asymmetric information in the Home lnsurance Market

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<rdf:Description>
<dc:creator>Ove Aarbu, Karl</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2017-03-01</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Sumario: We test for the presence of asymmetric information in the home insurance market on a data set containing about half a million home insurance contracts, applying several different specifications of the conditional correlation test. Unlike earlier studies, we control for private information about risk aversion by having access to detailed administrative register information at the policyholder level.Wefind robust evidence of asymmetric information. Asymmetric information may stem from adverse selection or moral hazard. To disentangle moral hazard and adverse selection, we utilize an exogenous law reform that had an effect on the insurance price. Our test shows no indication of moral hazard. </dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/159592.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>spa</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Seguro multirriesgo del hogar</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Mercado de seguros</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Cálculo actuarial</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Asymmetric information in the Home lnsurance Market</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 01/03/2017 Volumen 84 Número 1 - marzo 2017 , p. 35-72</dc:relation>
</rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>