Endogenous insolvency in the Rothschild-Stiglitz model

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<dc:creator>Mimra, Wanda</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Wambach, Achim</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2019-03-01</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Sumario: Even 30 years after Rothschild and Stiglitz's (1976) seminal work on competitive insurance markets with adverse selection, existence and characterization of the equilibrium outcome are still an open issue. We model a basic extension to the Rothschild and Stiglitz model: we endogenize up-front capital of insurers. Under limited liability, low up-front capital gives rise to an aggregate endogenous insolvency risk, which introduces an externality among customers of an insurer (Faynzilberg, 2006). It is shown that an equilibrium with the second-best efficient Miyazaki-Wilson-Spence allocation always exists.</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/167963.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Mercado de seguros</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Modelos matemáticos</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Cálculo actuarial</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Insolvencia</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Selección de riesgos</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Control de riesgos</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Endogenous insolvency in the Rothschild-Stiglitz model</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 01/03/2019 Volumen 86 Número 1 - marzo 2019 , p. 165-181</dc:relation>
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