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On the optimality of a straight deductible under belief heterogeneity

Recurso electrónico / Electronic resource
Registro MARC
Tag12Valor
LDR  00000cab a2200000 4500
001  MAP20190019170
003  MAP
005  20190625124236.0
008  190619e20190101gbr|||p |0|||b|eng d
040  ‎$a‎MAP‎$b‎spa‎$d‎MAP
084  ‎$a‎6
100  ‎$0‎MAPA20110012106‎$a‎Chi, Yichun
24500‎$a‎On the optimality of a straight deductible under belief heterogeneity‎$c‎Yichun Chi
300  ‎$a‎20 p.
520  ‎$a‎This article attempts to extend Arrow's theorem of the deductible to the case of belief heterogeneity, which allows the insured and the insurer to have different beliefs about the distribution of the underlying loss. Like Huberman et al. [(1983) Bell Journal of Economics 14(2), 415426], we preclude ex post moral hazard by asking both parties in the insurance contract to pay more for a larger realization of the loss. It is shown that, ceteris paribus, full insurance above a constant deductible is always optimal for any chosen utility function of a risk-averse insured if and only if the insurer appears more optimistic about the conditional loss given non-zero loss than the insured in the sense of monotone hazard rate order. We derive the optimal deductible level explicitly and then examine how it is affected by the changes of the insured's risk aversion, the insurance price and the degree of belief heterogeneity.
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080602437‎$a‎Matemática del seguro
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20190008242‎$a‎Teorema de Arrow
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000420‎$t‎Astin bulletin‎$d‎Belgium : ASTIN and AFIR Sections of the International Actuarial Association‎$x‎0515-0361‎$g‎01/01/2019 Volumen 49 Número 1 - enero 2019 , p. 243-262