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Equilibrium in insurance markets with adverse selection when insurers pay policy dividends

Recurso electrónico / Electronic resource
Registro MARC
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100  ‎$0‎MAPA20080648671‎$a‎Picard, Pierre
24510‎$a‎Equilibrium in insurance markets with adverse selection when insurers pay policy dividends‎$c‎Pierre Picard
520  ‎$a‎We show that an equilibrium always exists in the RothschildStiglitz insurance market model with adverse selection and an arbitrary number of risk types, when insurance contracts include policy dividend rules. The MiyazakiWilsonSpence state-contingent allocation is an equilibrium allocation (defined as a set of type-dependent lotteries sustained at a symmetric equilibrium of a market game), and it is the only one when out-of-equilibrium beliefs satisfy a robustness criterion. It is shown that stock insurers and mutuals may coexist, with stock insurers offering insurance coverage at actuarial price and mutuals cross-subsidizing risks.
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080591182‎$a‎Gerencia de riesgos
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080584290‎$a‎Contrato de seguro
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080592011‎$a‎Modelos actuariales
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080602437‎$a‎Matemática del seguro
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000727‎$t‎The Journal of risk and insurance‎$d‎Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-‎$x‎0022-4367‎$g‎02/12/2019 Volumen 86 Número 4 - diciembre 2019 , p. 887-914