Moral hazard in reinsurance markets

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      <subfield code="a">Moral hazard in reinsurance markets</subfield>
      <subfield code="c">Neil Doherty, Kent Smetters</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">The articles focuses on the moral hazard in the reinsurance market, wich the authors believe might help to explain the emergence of securitized insurance instruments. The idea that insurance - and, by extension, reinsurance -might lead to moral hazard is, of course not new. This article, however, provides empirical evidence of moral hazard in the reinsurance market. They test to see if reinsurers control for moral hazard by using loss-sensitive future premiums and-or by monitoring</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">The Journal of risk and insurance</subfield>
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      <subfield code="t">The Journal of risk and insurance</subfield>
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      <subfield code="g">Volume 72, number 3, September 2005 ;  p. 375-391</subfield>
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