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Testing for asymmetric information in the automobile insurance market under rate regulation

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Título: Testing for asymmetric information in the automobile insurance market under rate regulation / Kuniyoshi SaitoAutor: Saito, Kuniyoshi
Notas: This article examines whether adverse selection or moral hazard could be induced by rate regulation, which prohibits insurance companies from considering some attributes of drivers in setting premiums. Using an individual data set from a heavily regulated automobile insurance market, author arrives to a couple of conclusionsRegistros relacionados: En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Orlando. - Volume 73, number 1, June 2006 ; p. 335-356Materia / lugar / evento: Empresas de seguros Seguro de automóviles Mercado de seguros Daño moral Selección de riesgos Casos prácticos Japón Títulos secundarios: Título: The Journal of risk and insurance
Otras clasificaciones: 322